The Senate is considering legislation that would empower the president to impose new tariffs on Russia and its trading partners. The push to pass the bill is being aided by a desire to honor Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC). While understandable, that is no reason to rush a vote on this poorly designed bill.
The proposed Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, introduced by Sens. Graham and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), includes two tariff-specific sanctions provisions. One would require President Trump to impose tariffs of up to 500% on imports from Russia.
New U.S. tariffs are unlikely to be effective with respect to Russian aggression in Ukraine. The United States accounts for less than 1% of Russia’s exports, based on 2024 total exports of $381 billion. This low level of Russian reliance on the U.S. market leaves us with little leverage available through the direct imposition of tariffs.
The Sanctioning Russia Act is not the first effort to hit Russia with punitive economic sanctions. In 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the tariff on U.S. imports from Russia from 1.3% in 2021 to a simple average rate of 32% and banned imports of Russian oil. As a result, U.S. imports from Russia fell by 87% from 2021 to 2024. These punitive measures failed to deter Russian hostility.
A more concerning provision of the legislation would require President Trump to hit Russia indirectly by imposing tariffs of up to 100% on Russia’s top five export markets for crude oil or natural gas, and on the top five countries that are facilitating oil sanctions evasion.
The countries potentially hit by these tariffs would depend on the definitions used and the time frame chosen as the basis for calculating Russian exports, which appear to be left up to the Trump Administration to define.
According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Russia’s top crude oil export markets in June were China, India, Turkey, the European Union (EU), and Myanmar. Its top export markets for liquefied natural gas (LNG) were the EU, China, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey. Its top export markets for pipeline gas were the EU, China, Turkey, Serbia, and Moldova.
The bill’s supporters provided a slightly different list that broke out individual EU countries: China, India, Slovakia, Hungary, and Azerbaijan for crude, and, and China, France, Japan, Hungary, and Belgium for natural gas.
However, the bill contains a loophole intended to spare countries that import less than 15% of Russia’s natural gas from the tariffs. The bill’s backers say this would exempt Japan, France, Hungary, and Belgium from tariffs. For these four countries, the loophole is time-sensitive. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) would be required to recalculate the top-five lists every 180 days. A country that is not on the list today could be on it 180 days from now or at literally any point in the future, since the bill has no end date. Good luck, Europe, Japan, and everyone else that imports energy from Russia.
India’s response to the Sanctioning Russia Act was predictably harsh. According to a spokesman for the Indian National Congress, the country’s second-largest political party, “Trump fully backs the bill threatening 100% tariff on buying Russian oil. BUT their new bill will exempt European allies for purchasing Russian natural gas.”
Pawan Khera, a member of Parliament from the same party, tweeted: “Imagine the humiliation: needing Trump’s approval to buy Russian oil, and now being threatened with punitive tariffs for doing exactly that.”
There is no guarantee that the bill would significantly reduce Russia’s energy revenues. Consider India and China. The United States is India’s largest export market. The imposition of 100% tariffs would devastate the country’s economy. The alternative for India—ending oil imports from Russia—is not much better. If the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, India has no significant alternative source of oil. In recognition of this dilemma, the Trump Administration previously waived existing sanctions applying to in-transit Russian oil from March 5 to April 11 and again from April 15 to June 17 for humanitarian reasons to help poorer nations. The Administration would face similar pressure to delay new tariffs on India as long as transportation through the Strait of Hormuz is threatened.
With respect to China, it would be difficult for the Administration to impose new blanket tariffs on all goods from China at the same time it is attempting to walk back excessive taxes on specific Chinese goods. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) just closed a comment period seeking public input on “non-sensitive products that would benefit from favorable tariff modifications.” Imposing new across-the-board tariffs on all Chinese imports would conflict with USTR’s efforts to find a possible pathway to lower tariffs on non-sensitive products and to establish a U.S.-China Board of Trade.
Notably, many legislators who voted for previous Russia sanctions bills have strongly criticized the new proposal. In 2022, Sens. Rand Paul (R-KY) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Reps. Richard Neal (D-MA) and Gregory Meeks (D-NY) each voted for the oil import ban and the revocation of “normal” tariffs on Russian goods. Each has expressed concern about delegating new tariff authority to the President.
The bill could be improved by requiring termination of tariffs if Russia engages in good faith negotiations for peace with Ukraine and adheres to any resulting agreement. The 2025 Sanctioning Russia Act included similar language authorizing tariffs for a variety of clearly defined reasons, including refusal to negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine. The new bill simply mandates new tariffs at levels determined by the president.
To comply with Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution and limit the possibility for abuse, any tariffs proposed under the act should require approval by Congress. The arbitrary language exempting some purchasers of Russian oil and gas from tariffs entirely while hitting others with tariffs of up to 100% should be revised to exempt all countries that are taking significant steps to reduce energy purchases from Russia, while recognizing the challenges facing countries that have few practical alternatives for energy while transportation through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted.
To recap: if the Sanctioning Russia Act becomes law, we don’t know which countries would potentially be subject to tariffs from one 180-day period to the next. We don’t know whether the Trump Administration would impose tariffs, or which countries it would choose to target. We don’t know whether the tariffs would be 1%, 100%, or somewhere in between. The only certainty is that Americans would face even more economic uncertainty. And, not surprisingly, Trump has already suggested the bill’s coverage could be expanded beyond Russia. The Senate should not allow a rush to honor a fallen colleague to result in passage of this potentially costly legislation.