During the summer, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing titled “Exploring Process Approaches for Addressing Social Security Solvency,” featuring a panel of witnesses who were all quite knowledgeable about Social Security’s financial issues. One witness in particular, Chuck Blahous, was one of the last two Public Trustees on the Social Security Board of Trustees, who oversee the Social Security Trust Funds and write a report to Congress each year on the status of the funds. Since his term ended in 2015, the positions have remained vacant, leaving the public with no independent voices to directly interpret the finances of the Trust Fund.
While the title of the hearing suggested the possibility of a wide-ranging discussion on how Congress can best work to fix Social Security, it ended up being focused on a specific bill introduced by several senators on the Committee. This legislation, S. 4979, the Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone Act (PROMISE) Act of 2026, proposes a fast-moving process to consider major Social Security solvency reforms during this fall’s lame duck legislative session. It requires the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB), which was created back in 1994 to provide advice and recommendations to the President, Congress, and the Commissioner of Social Security on its policies and programs, to propose to Congress a specific solvency proposal with detailed legislative language. Despite the fact that the SSAB is currently without any presidential appointments and does not currently have any staff support, it would be directed to design a proposal that would achieve long-term solvency (defined as the ability to pay 100% of promised benefits for at least 50 years). It would then require both houses of Congress to convene and consider these proposals within a week of receiving them. If this sounds challenging, that’s the easy part.
If the SSAB does not submit a proposal by a certain date, then either the Senate Majority Leader or the Speaker of the House may propose solvency legislation. If they fail to do so, the PROMISE Act would provide the opportunity for any member of the House or Senate to propose solvency legislation, so long as there is at least one primary cosponsor from the other side of the aisle on the bill. These bills are then required to be considered by the committees of jurisdiction in each house of Congress: the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways and Means. These committees then have until November 9—just six days after election day—to consider and take action on these bills. If the committees don’t take action, which is likely since Congress will be out of session for almost this entire time, then these bills automatically get discharged and reported to the floor of each house. Each house would then have until November 16 to take up consideration of each bill. By then, Congress would be in full lame duck status, with a large amount of other bills to consider on its plate. The bill places further restrictions on amendments, basically forcing votes to be held on these solvency proposals during the holiday season.
It would be highly unlikely for this Congress to seriously consider Social Security solvency proposals at the last minute in a lame duck session of Congress. However, there are some good reasons to consider encouraging this process to play out.
To begin with, the Social Security Trust Fund is approaching insolvency in the fall of 2032, with incoming senators this year likely being forced to face the issue head-on during their terms in office. And this discussion is occurring as the bond markets are demanding higher yields for the federal government’s debt, reflecting concerns about the unsustainable budget. Fixing Social Security could go a long way in taming the bond market. On top of that, several senior retiring senators from both sides of the aisle are supporting the PROMISE Act, and they collectively have the clout to force action on this measure if they chose to do it. Overall, a strange constellation of legislative opportunity may be opening up for actually considering solvency legislation during the lame duck session.
However, there are clear headwinds that would need to be dealt with before real progress could be made. While several important bipartisan organizations are behind the legislation, powerful groups on both the left and right are railing against this bill. On the left side of the aisle, AARP has come out strongly against the measure, stating that the bill would allow “unelected special interest” groups the opportunity to negotiate “backroom deals” that could lower Social Security benefits. This is a somewhat biased opinion of the SSAB: they may be understaffed and have a few board vacancies, but current members are highly qualified and have been appointed by both Democratic and Republican leadership from both houses of Congress. AARP instead wants Social Security to be discussed in an open debate using regular order, mainly so it can mobilize its millions of members to oppose any form of benefit deductions for Social Security benefits that have been rising faster than wages for many years. Considering the massive $40 trillion federal debt our nation faces, any Social Security solution that relies purely on tax increases is unlikely to pass.
On the conservative side of the aisle, some groups have expressed concerns that this could increase the likelihood of tax increases and empower Democrats. However, any changes to Social Security will almost certainly require bipartisanship because congressional rules disallow the use of reconciliation on Social Security, so any fix will need votes from both parties to pass. And conservatives must confront this public policy crisis with a sober view of public opinion. Should policymakers wait until programmatic cuts are imminent, the likelihood of tax increases or other objectionable reforms only increases.
Virtually every past reform of the Social Security program has come as a result of some sort of commission that was formed to advise Congress on possible changes. According to information compiled by the Center for a Responsible Federal Budget, fixes made in 1939, 1950, 1956, 1972, 1977, and 1983 were all at least partially derived from information provided by commissions. NTU has had a long standing record supporting commissions and other legislative vehicles to appropriately deal with our nation’s massive debt and burgeoning fiscal crisis, partially because big fixes require leaders from both parties to make real sacrifices. These big fixes tend to stand the test of time better than one-sided fixes made via tools like reconciliation. The 1983 Social Security reform kept the program solvent for almost 50 years—not a bad result.
Personally, I am a little more suspicious of the direct value of commissions or special legislative tools to fix Social Security. For example, the Greenspan Commission did not actually fix Social Security in 1983, when the program was months away from exhaustion: a couple of key members of Congress came up with a solution and gave it to the Commission to propose. That is how solvency will likely be achieved, by members of Congress cutting a deal and getting it done.
However, when looking back at the 1983 fix, it is clear that the Greenspan Commission process played a key role in seeding the ground and providing a framework for discussions that eventually led to Social Security solvency. Key policymakers interact, learn from, and discuss policy more intensively as a result of a process like this. Process does indeed matter. AARP’s idea of a long and extensive process to debate and fix the program is not likely, at least on a bipartisan basis. And a one-sided fix will do more to destabilize the program than anything else in the history of Social Security.
Congress should revise the deadlines listed in the PROMISE Act and pass it without delay. It is not even close to being a perfect bill. Nor does it set up a perfect policy process. But it does give Congress a small chance to fix Social Security in the short term, possibly helping calm financial markets and provide a clearer and more stable future for millions of Americans nearing retirement. Groups like NTU will be there to protect the interests of taxpayers, and to campaign vigorously against any unfair and anti-growth tax increases. But the debate needs to happen sooner rather than later. Why not get started now?