A new report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) confirms what NTUF has warned for years: Washington has treated the Strategic Petroleum Reserve less like a strategic energy security asset and more like a fiscal and political tool.
We first warned in 2021 that the SPR “should be treated strategically, not as a piggy bank” as bipartisan legislation sold off SPR inventory to “offset” higher, unrelated spending without any discussion of the reserve’s proper size or role. That warning has only become more relevant as presidential orders continued to draw down the SPR in response to economic and geopolitical shocks.
The GAO report notes that Congress is beginning to refocus on the SPR’s long-term role through a review of its condition, the first in over a decade. After the conclusion of the most recent drawdown due to the unstable situation in the Middle East, the reserve is badly in need of repairs. Lawmakers should also consider reforms aimed at easing the costs of refilling and maintaining the reserve.
GAO’s Findings
The SPR was created after the 1970s oil embargo to protect Americans from severe supply disruptions. GAO reports that the Department of Energy has released more than 500 million barrels from the reserve since 1985, with nearly 70% of all releases occurring from 2014 through 2025. The 180-million-barrel release in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was the largest in SPR history and tested a reserve already facing an extended backlog of deferred maintenance. In March 2026, DOE began a planned 172-million-barrel release in response to the war in Iran.
The SPR exists to be used in genuine emergencies. Unfortunately, a lot of the drawdowns were through congressionally mandated sales. GAO notes that Congress has directed roughly 170 million barrels in revenue-generating sales to date, with tens of millions more planned, often without establishing clear priorities or a target size for the reserve.
That is exactly the concern NTUF raised in 2021, with research showing that policymakers treated the SPR as a fiscal “pay for” rather than a strategic asset. In 2025, we noted that Congress had booked billions of dollars in offsets from non-emergency SPR sales while leaving taxpayers exposed to the much larger cost of refilling the reserve and repairing aging infrastructure. Earlier this year, we warned again that a real oil crisis would expose the costs of treating the SPR as a legislative ATM.
GAO also flags a more basic problem: the SPR’s infrastructure is getting old and Washington hasn’t kept up. The reserve relies on aging salt caverns, pipelines, and surface facilities that now face a sizable maintenance backlog.
The 2022 drawdown put that system under real stress, revealing that years of deferred maintenance limit how quickly and reliably oil can be moved in or out of the SPR. Without repairs and upgrades, the ability to draw on the SPR in a crisis will erode and taxpayers will ultimately bear the higher costs.
SPR Inventory Has Fallen to Early-1980s Levels
The latest inventory data underscores why GAO is right to call for a long-term plan. EIA’s monthly data show the SPR at 394.5 million barrels in April 2026, already far below its 2009 peak of nearly 727 million barrels. DOE announced that the 172-million-barrel release would start in late March and occur over roughly 120 days, but it remains unclear how much of the planned drawdown will ultimately be needed if tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue to ease.
SPR update by Courtney Manley
One private tracker, Global Energy Flow, projects three possible scenarios: an optimistic deal-and-recovery case in which the draw pauses and refilling begins, with end-of-year inventory of 360 million barrels; a slower grind in which drawdowns occur at a reduced pace, with an end-of-year inventory of 300 million barrels; and a re-escalation scenario in which the SPR declines to 250 million barrels, approaching operationally concerning levels. That uncertainty is exactly why Congress and DOE need a strategic plan before the next crisis, not after it.
GAO’s Recommendations
GAO recommends that Congress require DOE to complete periodic long-term plans for the SPR, consider limiting non-emergency sales, and explore funding mechanisms that would better align SPR revenues with the cost of maintaining the reserve. GAO also noted that Congress has begun to show some attention to these issues through committee report language and in the forthcoming appropriations process, including requests for additional reporting on the SPR’s condition and long-term needs. While these steps are encouraging, they fall short of the comprehensive strategy that GAO says is still missing.
NTUF’s Recommendations
This is a fiscal issue as much as an energy issue. When Congress sells oil from the reserve to make legislation appear less expensive, the federal budget may record near-term savings. But those paper offsets do not eliminate the real-world cost of refilling the reserve later. Taxpayers paid to build and maintain the SPR, taxpayers lose when it is drained for non-emergency purposes, and taxpayers are left with the bill when policymakers decide it must be restored.
Now that Congress has taken some steps to provide for a comprehensive report on the state of the SPR, lawmakers should build on this progress by canceling the remaining congressionally-mandated drawdown of roughly 93 million barrels, restricting future non-emergency sales so that they aren’t used as budget gimmicks, and conducting oversight hearings regarding the proper size and mission of the reserve.
NTUF has also outlined several reforms to restore the SPR’s strategic purpose while minimizing costs to taxpayers. Lawmakers should pursue broader energy policy reforms that strengthen supply resilience and reduce the need for emergency drawdowns in the first place. That includes streamlining permitting for domestic energy infrastructure and reconsidering restrictions like the Jones Act that can raise transportation costs and limit flexibility during supply disruptions.
These steps would help ensure the SPR is used sparingly, strategically, and in true emergencies, while protecting taxpayers from unnecessary costs.
Conclusion
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is supposed to protect Americans from energy shocks. GAO’s report makes clear that Washington’s ad hoc approach has weakened that mission. Lawmakers should stop treating the SPR as a piggy bank and start managing it like the strategic asset taxpayers already paid for.