Introduction
The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), the nation’s emergency stockpile designed to cushion short-term energy shocks, today stands at 413 million barrels. But this is far below its peak of 726.6 million barrels in 2009 and its current capacity of 714 million barrels. One reason for the decrease is that policymakers have sold 280 million barrels from the SPR over the past decade as a budget gimmick to offset other spending, often without a serious debate about how the drawdowns affect the nation’s energy security.
With escalating tensions in the Middle East sending oil prices sharply higher and a threat to tankers passing through the Straits of Hormuz triggering a supply crunch, this debate is now of high importance. The SPR was founded after a Middle East crisis in the 1970s to protect the nation from precisely this kind of disruption. President Trump announced that the United States will release 172 million barrels from the SPR, joining the 32 member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA), who will release roughly 400 million barrels of oil to stabilize markets.
Background on the SPR
The SPR was created in the aftermath of the 1973–1974 oil embargo, when supply disruptions from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) triggered severe fuel shortages and economic turmoil. The U.S. and other advanced economies formed the International Energy Agency (IEA) to coordinate emergency energy planning among its members. Under the IEA agreement, participating countries committed to maintaining strategic petroleum reserves equal to at least 90 days of net oil imports as a buffer against major supply disruptions.
To fulfill the U.S. obligation to the IEA agreement, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, establishing a stockpile of crude oil stored in underground salt caverns along the Gulf Coast.
By holding hundreds of millions of barrels of crude oil that can be released as needed into the market, the reserve provides a buffer against disruptions caused by geopolitical conflict, natural disasters, or other emergencies. Although the Gulf Coast storage facilities could hold up to 750 million barrels, the reserve peaked at 726.6 million barrels in 2009.
The SPR Currently Stands at 413 Million Barrels, After Sales and Drawdowns of 300 Million Barrels Since 2009
The SPR can currently hold 714 million barrels under current authorizations. However, at the end of 2025, there were only 413 million barrels in the reserve, the lowest since 1984 despite modest replenishments over the course of the year. The Trump Administration added roughly 2 to 3 million barrels per month during 2025 through Department of Energy purchases and appropriated funding, raising the total by about 18 million barrels. Even with those additions, however, the reserve remains well below historical levels.
Against that backdrop, the Administration’s announced release of 172 million barrels represents a major drawdown that is equal to roughly 40% of the SPR’s current inventory, and will draw it down to about 34% of capacity.
The SPR Would Have 280 Million Barrels More Today If It Had Not Been Used as a Budget Gimmick
How did the SPR fall so far from its peak in 2009?
Part of the decline reflects presidential action. Presidents have authority to release reserves in response to emergencies. Most recently, the Biden Administration ordered the release of about 180 million barrels in 2022 in response to the energy shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Congress has also increasingly treated the SPR less as a strategic asset and more as a budgetary offset. Because receipts from SPR oil sales are counted as “offsetting receipts” in the federal budget, lawmakers used mandated drawdowns to help finance higher spending in major legislation while making those bills appear deficit neutral on paper. Since 2015, 280 million barrels have been drawn from the reserve to achieve budgetary offsets from spending. This includes:
- 58 million barrels under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
- 66 million barrels under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act Act (2016)
- 35 million barrels under the 21st Century Cures Act (2016)
- 7 million barrels under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (2017)
- 100 million barrels under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018
- 15 million barrels under the America’s Water Infrastructure Act (2018)
These sales generated billions of dollars in budgetary “offsets,” but they also significantly reduced the nation’s ability to confront a true oil supply emergency. As a result, when genuine geopolitical crises such as the current one threaten global supply, the reserve is far smaller than policymakers originally intended. Policymakers were warned: at several hearings, experts testified that Congress was treating this national security asset like a “legislative ATM” and the Government Accountability Office criticized budgetary selloffs made without considering the SPR’s optimal size. Ultimately, these warnings went unheeded.
Restoring the SPR
After this crisis passes, lawmakers must conduct a serious evaluation of the SPR’s optimal size before the next crisis hits. For too long, drawdowns and sell offs were conducted without consideration of the long-term consequences of reducing the nation’s emergency energy buffer.
At the same time, the reserve’s infrastructure has been aging and repairs are also needed to restore its structural integrity, which was touched upon in the hearings noted above. In a 2016 DOE report, SPR officials claimed 70% of the reserve’s equipment infrastructure was exceeding its serviceable life. Typically, after large extractions, the reserve tends to shrink and its lifespan does as well, making future oil extractions more difficult and less efficient. After President Biden’s drawdown in 2022 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, repair issues have only been exacerbated, with reports that pumps were damaged.
The fiscal consequences of these decisions are now becoming clear. Congress recorded roughly $18.3 billion in budgetary offsets from SPR sales through 2025. Yet, the Department of Energy estimated in 2025 that refilling the reserve could cost about $20 billion, along with $100 million to more than $200 million in needed repairs to aging infrastructure.
There are policies lawmakers could implement to ease the fiscal burden of refilling the SPR. President Trump has considered lifting the Jones Act during the current emergency to reduce costs for Americans. The Jones Act, officially known as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, mandates that all goods shipped between U.S. ports travel on American-built, -owned, and -crewed vessels. Given the lack of Jones Act-compliant ships, this restriction unnecessarily drives up costs for the transportation of goods and energy. Lifting the Jones Act during a crisis would provide temporary price relief from shipping costs, and repealing the Jones Act would provide permanent relief.
Additional reforms would help restore the SPR while lowering costs for taxpayers:
- Cancel remaining mandated SPR sales. Roughly 100 million barrels are still scheduled to be sold through FY2031 under past budget laws. Canceling these drawdowns would help restore the reserve’s role as a safeguard for genuine emergencies.
- Require strategic review before future drawdowns. Congress should establish clear criteria requiring that SPR releases be tied to genuine energy emergencies and subject to congressional oversight.
- Streamline energy permitting. Long delays under environmental and other regulatory reviews slow pipeline and infrastructure projects that move oil efficiently across the country. Permitting reform could reduce logistical costs and improve supply resilience.
- Modernize energy infrastructure and SPR management. Investments in pipelines, transport infrastructure, and SPR facility upgrades could reduce bottlenecks, lower refill costs, and improve long-term reliability. Leasing unused SPR cavern capacity to private operators could also generate revenue to offset maintenance expenses.
Conclusion
It is time for lawmakers to start treating the SPR strategically, not as a piggybank for “offsets” so that the nation is prepared before the next supply crisis. Selling reserves as a budgetary offset to make spending legislation more appealing completely undermines the SPR’s purpose and leaves heftier bills on the taxpayer. Inadequate reserves also leave Americans more vulnerable than they have to be the next time a crisis strikes.