Americans
pay a mind-boggling array of taxes--income taxes, payroll taxes, sales taxes,
utility taxes--and one result is that most people have no idea how high their
tax burden actually is. This paper identifies $638.8 billion in hidden taxes,
or $2,413 in hidden taxes for every American.
These
hidden taxes undermine our democratic decision-making process. If people don't
accurately perceive how much government policies cost them, how can they make
informed decisions in our democratic process? When taxes are not visible,
Americans are unable to evaluate whether they're getting their money's worth
for their tax dollars. As a result, hidden taxes help boost the size of government.
This paper
estimates that the total U.S. tax burden is equal to 40 percent of annual
personal consumption spending. If Americans recognized this high level of
taxation, there might well be a second American Revolution.
To maintain
support for so many programs, it's often in the interest of governments to
keep their costs hidden. Commenting on hidden telecommunications taxes, American
Enterprise Institute fellow James Glassman put his finger on the problem:
The idea here is an old one: People can't rebel if they're kept in the dark.
In addition
to increasing the size of government, hidden taxes are an especially harmful
way to raise money. Hidden taxes distort the prices that Americans face, causing
them to over-consume some products and under-consume others. As a result,
hidden taxes inflict more economic damage than broad-based, visible taxes.
There
is some good news. While hidden taxes are significant in the United States,
they could be even higher. For example, America is one of the few countries
without a value-added tax (VAT), a type of hidden sales tax. In addition,
the move to deregulate the telecommunication and utility industries will help
make taxes for those services much clearer to consumers.
Communities
are much stronger when they consist of a well-informed citizenry. Working
to bring more hidden taxes into the open world would give Americans the information
they need to make thoughtful choices about the role of government in the United
States.
Americans pay a mind-boggling array of taxes--income taxes, payroll taxes,
sales taxes, utility taxes--and one result is that most people have no idea
how high their tax burden actually is.
While some taxes are fairly obvious, many others are hidden from
plain view. This violates a basic principle of taxation--that taxes
should be visible to the people who pay them. If people don't
accurately perceive how much government policies cost them, then how
can they make informed decisions in our democratic process? This
paper identifies $638.8 billion in hidden taxes, or $2,413 in hidden
taxes per person.(2)
Some of these taxes are inadvertently hidden, but others are
consciously designed that way to disguise the cost of government.
It's easy to see why: the total U.S. tax burden is equal to 40
percent of annual personal consumption spending.(3)
If Americans recognized this high level of taxation, there might well
be a second American Revolution. To maintain support for so many
programs, it's often in the interest of governments to keep their
costs hidden.
Americans are subject to a host of different forms of taxes.
The many types and levels of taxation help explain why taxes are so
steep: giving governments more options for taxation usually
encourages higher tax burdens.(4)
Figure 1 shows the relative magnitude of different U.S. taxes.
Figure 1. U.S. Tax Revenue(5)
For the purposes of this paper, a hidden tax is one that is not
explicitly clear to the taxpayer. For example, sales taxes generally
are not considered to be hidden taxes, because the costs are clearly
indicated on cash register receipts. This methodology can be compared
to the definition used by the U.S. Census Bureau:
One important feature of tax revenue is the need to pass a
"visibility test." That is, the tax levy must be visible to the
taxpayer as being a tax and not buried under the guise of another
revenue. Take, for instance, a tax on utility services provided by
the government levying the tax. If the utility bill does not itemize
the tax but incorporates it into its user charge rate (therefore
being invisible to the customer as a tax), then that so-called "tax"
is reported as a utility revenue for Census Bureau purposes.(6)
SUP>
Therefore the Census Bureau counts the revenue when the utility
company pays it, even though the tax may have been financed by the
company's customers.
Many regulations, mandates, and other government policies have
been described as hidden taxes because of the costs they impose on
Americans. However, this paper focuses primarily on tax policy, not a
broader definition of hidden taxes.(7)
Table 2 graphically demonstrates the impact of several hidden
taxes.
In 1996, federal, state, and local governments collected over $201
billion in corporate income taxes, or the equivalent of $760 a
person.(9) Many individuals believe
that figure represents $201 billion that the rest of us don't have to
pay. Some critics claim that corporations should pay even more in
taxes.
On the surface, taxing corporations instead of people may sound
appealing. However, it's not that simple, since corporations
are people working as a legal entity. In addition, when the
government imposes corporate income taxes, the potential responses
include:
Under any of the three options, Americans end up paying the tax
either through lower wages if they work for a corporation, poorer
performance if they own a mutual fund, or higher prices when they buy
a product.(10) But this tax burden
doesn't show up on any pay slip or price tag.
Hidden corporate taxes impose an even greater burden because they
represent double-taxation. When a company earns a profit, it pays
taxes on that money. When it pays its stockholders a dividend, that
same money is taxed again. This double-taxation discourages
much-needed investment. Harvard economist Dale Jorgensen calculates
that double-taxation reduces our national wealth by about a
trillion dollars.(11)
Everyone who owns a mutual fund or IRA, or who participates in a
401(k) or typical pension plan, is penalized by this double-taxation.
Even relatively low-income Americans increasingly rely on stocks for
a portion of their savings. According to the Federal Reserve Bank,
from 1989 to 1995 the share of stocks as a percent of total assets
doubled for families with incomes under $25,000.(12)
P>
How much does a gallon of gasoline cost? Many Americans might be
surprised by the answer, because the price to actually produce and
deliver the product is much lower than the amount posted at the
pump.
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the average
price for a gallon of gasoline as of May 1996 was $1.38. However,
this statistic is highly misleading: 40.8 cents of the price
consisted of gasoline taxes.(13) In
other words, as of 1996, gas taxes inflated the price of gasoline by
42 percent. (With the current price of gasoline at about $1.10 per
gallon, gas taxes increase the price of gasoline by nearly 59
percent.)
Unlike sales taxes, gas taxes don't appear anywhere on the receipt
after you fill up. Lucky motorists may find the state and federal tax
rate in small print somewhere on the gasoline pump. But since the
total amount they pay is hidden, most Americans don't recognize the
tax burden when they buy their gas, and they certainly have no idea
of the annual cost of gas taxes.
As Table 3 shows, gas taxes haven't always been so high. While the
pre-tax price of gas fell by 31 cents between 1980 and 1995, this
decline coincided with an increase in gas taxes of 26.6 cents, so
that the retail price remained virtually unchanged.
When you buy a gallon of gasoline, the government receives the
largest chunk of your money. According to one report, for a dollar's
worth of gasoline, 34 cents are accounted for by exploration and
production, refining takes up 6 cents, wholesalers get a nickel, and
the service station owner gets 12 cents. As Figure 2 shows, taxes
take up the rest.
Stephen Moore of the Cato Institute concludes that over the past
20 years gas taxes have been the fastest-growing federal taxes
imposed on middle-income Americans. Moore observes:
Earlier this year [1997] Republicans adopted a
sensible policy that required all gas tax dollars to be spent on
roads, not other government programs. That well-intentioned policy
inadvertently created a whole new set of problems. It turns out
that the care and maintenance of the highway system don't require
anything like an 18.4 cent gas tax. After all, in the 1950s and
1960s we built the interstate highway system with a maximum
federal gasoline tax of just 4 cents a gallon. Maintenance of
those roads shouldn't cost 18 cents a gallon.(16)
BLOCKQUOTE>
Fuel taxes cost Americans $32.1 billion, or $121 a person. But as Table 4 shows,
additional transportation taxes and related revenues totaled $86 billion as
of 1994.
|
Table 4. Transportation Revenues by Mode and Revenue Raising Instrument:
FY 1994(17)
(Billions)
|
|
Highway, total
|
$60.1
|
Air, total
|
$13.1
|
|
Federal:
|
|
Federal Airport & Airway
Trust Fund
|
$6.0
|
|
Highway Trust Fund
|
$15.4
|
State airport charges
|
$.7
|
|
State:
|
|
Local airport charges
|
$6.4
|
|
Motor fuel taxes
|
$24.5
|
Transit, total
|
$8.9
|
|
Motor vehicle license taxes
|
$11.8
|
HTF Transit Account
|
$2.7
|
|
Motor vehicle operator
license taxes
|
$1.1
|
State transit charges
|
$1.2
|
|
Reg & toll highway charges
|
$3.2
|
Local transit charges
|
$5.0
|
|
Local:
|
|
Water, total
|
$3.2
|
|
Motor fuel taxes
|
$.7
|
Federal water receipts
|
$1.4
|
|
Motor vehicle license taxes
|
$.9
|
State water transit charges
|
$.4
|
|
Motor vehicle operator
license taxes
|
N.A.
|
Local water transit charges
|
$1.4
|
|
Reg & toll highway charges
|
$2.0
|
Pipeline Safety Fund
|
N.A.
|
|
Parking charges
|
$1.1
|
Emergency Preparedness Fund
|
N.A.
|
"Sin" Taxes
The gas tax is just one example of an excise tax. Unlike retail
sales taxes, which are clear to consumers, excise taxes are imposed
on producers. As a result, the final cost of excise taxes is often
hidden from consumers. These taxes lower consumption of the taxed
product and increase consumption of other products. Because they
distort people's spending decisions, excise taxes can be a
particularly costly way for governments to raise money.
In general, most experts believe that tax policy should be
neutral--it should neither favor nor discriminate against specific
goods or services. While policymakers often follow this advice, a
notable exception to this rule is provided by taxes on items that the
government decides are unhealthy, like products containing alcohol
and tobacco. These "sin" taxes provide a major source of excise tax
revenue. Since consumers of these products often lack the political
clout to counter the revenue stream available to taxing authorities,
sin taxes have been an especially attractive tool to finance
government spending. Some examples of sin taxes follow.
Beer Taxes
Many taxes are raised during wartime but never returned to their
original level. For example, the federal government hiked beer taxes
to help pay for the Korean War. The taxes were maintained after the
war, and then doubled in 1991. According to the consulting firm of
DRI/McGraw Hill, 43 percent of the cost of each six-pack comes from
taxes, versus a 30 percent tax component for most other consumer
goods. Therefore, if not for taxes, a $5.00 six-pack would cost just
$2.85. Adam Thierer of the Heritage Foundation observes that beer
taxes tend to be regressive, with about two-thirds of the beer sold
in America bought by households earning less than $45,000.(18)
SUP>
Figure 3. Total Taxes Hidden in a Bottle of
Beer(19)
Liquor Taxes
Not surprisingly, taxes on so-called "hard" liquor tend to be even
more punitive. Combined local, state, and federal taxes account for
close to half (45 percent) of the cost of distilled spirits. Tax
revenues from liquor are many times higher than the total profits of
distillers. As with beer taxes and other sin taxes, distilled spirits
taxes are regressive. According to one study, these taxes are five
times higher as a percent of income for lower-income families as for
their higher-income counterparts.(20)
Tobacco Taxes
Tobacco products are portrayed even more negatively than alcoholic
beverages, so taxing users of these products is correspondingly
popular with government officials. However, like other sin taxes,
tobacco taxes are also very regressive. The Joint Economic Committee
concludes that at the federal level, two-thirds of cigarette taxes
come from smokers who earn less than $40,000 per year. According to
the Tax Foundation, the recent 15 cents per pack tax hike left
smokers earning less than $15,000 a year with 34 percent of the tax
burden.(21)
The current 24-cent federal tax on a pack of cigarettes is
scheduled to increase to 34 cents per pack in the year 2000 and 39
cents per pack in 2002, with much higher taxes recently under
consideration. State taxes vary from 2.5 cents to nearly a dollar per
pack. Cigars are subject to a federal tax of up to 12.75 percent,
chewing tobacco is taxed at 12 cents per pound, and pipe tobacco is
taxed at 67.5 cents per pound. These taxes are scheduled to increase along with cigarette taxes in
the years 2000 and 2002.(22)
Appendix 1 shows each state's excise tax rate for gasoline,
cigarettes, distilled spirits, wine, and beer.
Other Excise Taxes
The federal government levies several other excise taxes,
including:
Vaccination Taxes
The government imposes a 75-cent per dose excise tax on vaccines
for DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus), DT (diphtheria, tetanus),
MMR (measles, mumps, or rubella), polio, HIB (haemophilus influenza type B), Hepatitis B, and
varicella (chickenpox).(23)
Firearms Taxes
The government imposes a 10 percent excise tax on pistols and
revolvers, an 11 percent tax on other firearms, and an 11 percent tax
on shells and cartridges.
Phone Taxes
A 3 percent excise tax on telephone services cost $4.2 billion and
universal service subsidies an additional $944 million in 1996. On
top of this $944 million, governments historically have subsidized
universal service through regulations that boost phone bills for some
users in order to subsidize others. One study put the cost of this
hidden tax at $5 billion.(24)
|
Table 5. Federal Excise Tax Revenue
(Millions)(25)
|
|
"General" Revenue
|
|
|
Alcohol
|
$ 7,220
|
|
Tobacco
|
$ 5,795
|
|
Telephone
|
$ 4,234
|
|
Ozone Depleting Chemicals
|
$ 320
|
|
Transportation Fuels
|
$ 7,468
|
|
Other
|
$ 410
|
|
"Trust Fund" Revenue
|
|
|
Highway
|
$ 24,651
|
|
Airport and Airway
|
$ 2,369
|
|
Black Lung Disability
|
$ 614
|
|
Inland Waterway
|
$ 108
|
|
Superfund
|
$ 313
|
|
Oil Spill Liability
|
$ 34
|
|
Aquatic Resources
|
$ 315
|
|
Leaking Underground Storage Tank
|
$ 48
|
|
Vaccine Injury Compensation
|
$ 115
|
|
Total Excise Taxes
|
$ 54,014
|
Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has introduced legislation to repeal the
phone excise tax.(26) However, as
discussed below, much steeper taxes are in the works to finance new
telecommunications subsidies. On the positive side, deregulation is
leading toward replacement of "implicit" hidden telecommunications
regulatory subsidies with "explicit" tax-financed subsidies. Making
the subsidy explicit to taxpayers will increase pressure to control
taxes. Combined federal excise tax revenue comes to $54 billion, or
more than $200 a person.
Examples of How Taxes Are Hidden in the Price of Goods
Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) has calculated several examples of
how taxes affect the purchase price of several goods and services.
The ATR figures include the impact of all taxes--not just certain
hidden taxes--on prices. According to ATR:
- Taxes account for 35 cents of the cost of a $1.14 loaf of bread.
- 18 cents of a 50-cent can of soda go toward taxes.
- 72 percent of the cost of a 750 ml bottle of liquor goes toward taxes.
- Taxes for an $80 hotel room average 43 percent.
- Taxes account for $63.60 of a $159 airline ticket.
- A $153.09 monthly utility bill consists of $39.35 in taxes.
- Over half the cost of a $1.33 gallon of gasoline is due to taxes.(27)
A 1992 Cato Institute study looked at taxes somewhat differently,
calculating how much someone needed to earn to have enough after-tax
dollars to purchase several products. The study concluded that a
typical worker needed to earn $17,038 to buy a $10,000 car, and
$2,556 to purchase a $1,500 computer.(28)
Telecommunications Taxes
State and federal governments have indirectly taxed some
telecommunications users and subsidized others for years. The
government first imposed telecommunications taxes to help finance the
Spanish-American War. Today, the impact of these taxes can be
significant: according to the cellular industry, a combination of
fees and mandates forces consumers to pay 20 to 30 percent more than
the actual cost of providing cellular service.(29)
For many years, the cost of telecommunications subsidies was
hidden in Americans' phone bills. As part of the move to deregulate
the industry, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was supposed to make
these costs explicit. However, it also opened the door to a big
increase in telecommunications taxes. The Act stated:
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including
low-income consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost
areas, should have access to telecommunications and information
services . . . that are reasonably comparable to those services
provided in urban areas and that are available at rates that are
reasonably comparable to rates charged for similar services in
urban areas. . . . Elementary and secondary schools and
classrooms, health care providers, and libraries should have access to advanced
telecommunications services.(30)
In other words, the Act suggested that residents in low-cost areas
should continue to pay more to subsidize service for Americans who
choose to live in high-cost areas, and it authorized additional
support for schools, libraries, and rural health care providers.
Subsidizing rural customers is not necessarily good policy. Kent
Lassman of Citizens for a Sound Economy explains:
Ted Turner owns a 160,000-acre ranch in Montana. For
$8.45 million, Turner recently purchased 44,000 acres in Nebraska
to bring his holdings in the Cornhusker State to more than 96,500
acres. With more than 15,000 bison grazing on his land in Montana,
Nebraska and New Mexico, Turner-the-Rancher can afford a few of
life's luxuries--yet he does not pay the full cost of telephone
service.(31)
Even if it makes sense to subsidize high-cost users, financing
those subsidies by taxing telecommunications services does not. As
Stephen Entin pointed out, "[T]he government provides
universal access to food by giving needy people food stamps and
welfare checks. This assistance is funded out of general federal
revenues, not by an excise tax on groceries or a mandated
'contribution' by food stores to a 'Food Fund.'" (32)
Would Congress Have Imposed These Taxes?
FCC Commissioner Harold Furchgott-Roth estimated that the total
cost of federal universal access policies could require a 10 percent
tax on interstate services on top of the preexisting 3 percent
tax.(33) Many rural states want an
even bigger subsidy. For example, Utah Gov. Michael Leavitt
complained that federal government efforts to fund 25 percent of
universal service costs were inadequate, and provided the following
analogy:
The integrated national telecommunications network is directly
analogous to the interstate road system. . . . The economic benefits
that have been derived from taking a national approach to
transportation are obvious. One needs [sic] only look at a
country like Russia, which has vast natural resources and productive
farmland, to see the consequences of the failure to build a reliable
and universally available road system. They simply cannot bring their
resources and crops to market in an efficient manner. The decision to
impose 75 percent of the cost of maintaining universal service on the
individual states is a direct breach of the same principles that led to the development of the
interstate road system.(34)
It seems ironic that anyone could blame Russia's current economic
problems on a lack of government spending. If anything, the collapse
of the Soviet Union clearly shows the need to limit government
interference in the economy, not to increase government
intervention.
Bypassing Elected Officials
Commissioner Furchgott-Roth alluded to the
implications of taxation imposed by agencies other than Congress:
"The May 1997 universal service order promises the Schools and
Libraries Corporation, an entity of questionable legal status, $2.25
billion annually. This . . . is an arbitrary target, one that the FCC
could equally well, and with equal legal authority, have set at $22.5
million, or $225 million, or $22.5 billion, or $225 billion
[emphasis added]." (35)
Not everyone was happy about the imposition of taxes by unelected
federal officials. Former Budget Director Jim Miller observed:
The authority to tax has passed through so many hands
that it is nearly impossible to seek redress within the political
process. . . . . Common sense dictates that when government
officials command economic resources from taxpayers, those
officials should be those we elected to govern. Often this is the
reason cited to explain why in our system of government, 'All
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives.'
National Taxpayers Union President John Berthoud seconded this
opinion: "[B]efore one dime is taken, at a minimum, taxpayers
should have the ability to address elected officials on the topic,
and then later hold them accountable. It violates any and all basic
tenets of democratic representation to allow unelected officials to levy taxes on the American
public." (36)
"Explicit" Costs?
While the 1996 Act was supposed to make taxes and subsidies more
explicit, from the government's perspective, providing such clear
information also would increase opposition to government subsidies.
Therefore it was not particularly surprising when several companies
complained that although the FCC wanted them to fund new universal
service programs, they were not supposed to inform their customers of
the cost.
Randall Coleman of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry
Association argued, "They don't want us to call it a tax. But that's
exactly what it is." (37) Sprint
Corporation commented: "[A]lthough the Commission did not
prohibit carriers from passing through their USF (Universal Service
Fund) costs to end users, the Commission did bar carriers from
labeling any USF cost recovery charge on their bills a 'USF surcharge' [emphasis
added]." (38)
Who Pays?
The FCC answered questions about the cost of new subsidies to
connect schools and libraries to the Internet in the following
way:
Myth: Phone rates will go up for the residential
user in order to connect schools and libraries to the Internet.
Fact: Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Congress mandated that universal service include for the first
time support for schools, libraries, and rural health care
providers. Although the discounted services that eligible schools,
libraries, and health care providers receive will be paid for by
telecommunications providers' contributions to universal service,
we anticipate that this new assessment will be offset by other
changes resulting from the Act, such as the reductions in access charges that long-distance
companies will pay.(39)
Many Americans might prefer to see the reduced cost of service
reflected on their phone bills instead of used to offset new
government spending. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt admitted that higher
subsidies translate to higher prices: "It's a very small additional
subsidy. . . . It will be contributed by communications companies.
Will they pass it onto somebody? Yes, they'll pass it on to everyone
in America in insignificant ways down to . . . pennies a day. It will
be a collective action by all of America." (40)
Income Tax Withholding
When tax day comes around each year, many Americans are happy to
get a check from the federal government, even though they're just
getting back their own money--without interest.
Since income tax payments are withheld from their paychecks, the
cost of paying taxes is much less visible to them. This principle of
tax collection is similar to the advice offered by many financial
planners to have money automatically deducted from your paycheck for
investments, since you don't miss the money as much that way. As
David Brinkley commented:
Congress and the president learned, to their pleasure,
what automobile salesmen had learned long before: that installment
buyers could be induced to pay more because they looked not at the
total debt but only at the monthly payments. And in this case
there was, for government, the added psychological advantage that
people were paying their taxes with not much resistance because they were paying with money
they had never even seen.(41)
A Brief History
When the federal government instituted the income tax, technology
initially did not allow for withholding from workers' paychecks.
Ironically, the Internal Revenue Service itself was a leading
opponent of withholding because of its administrative complexity.
In addition, withholding carried political risks. In 1916,
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo suggested that ". . . it would
be very advantageous to . . . do away with the [authorization
of] withholding of income tax at the source" in order to
"eliminate a great deal of criticism which has been directed against
the law." (42) But the adoption of
Social Security in the 1930s showed federal officials that automatic
withholding was now a more feasible option.(43)
Government officials saw withholding as a way to help meet the
financial burdens imposed by World War II. In 1942, the government
adopted a flat 5 percent "Victory Tax" on income above $624. The
Victory Tax was collected when income was earned, unlike regular
income tax payments, which taxpayers made in a lump sum from money
they saved during the prior year.
The combination of Social Security and the Victory Tax set the
stage for universal withholding. To sell withholding to the public,
the government combined it with an alleged "forgiveness" of one
year's income tax liability. Government officials were concerned that
adoption of withholding in 1943 would force taxpayers to write a
check for their 1942 liability while simultaneously having income
withheld for their 1943 liability. Therefore, they forgave a portion
of individuals' income tax liability to help sell adoption of
withholding beginning in 1943.
Withholding increased the burden on taxpayers in two ways. First,
money that previously could have been sitting in bank accounts
gaining interest now was preemptively taken by the government.
Second, making income tax costs less visible in turn made tax
increases much more feasible.
Today, withholding is widely accepted. House Majority Leader Dick
Armey (R-TX) initially proposed elimination of withholding in his
flat tax plan, describing withholding as a "crucial, deceptive
device" that permits the government to "raise taxes to their current
level without igniting a rebellion." (44)
While Rep. Armey later removed this feature from his plan, Rep. Cliff
Stearns (R-FL) has introduced stand-alone legislation proposing to
eliminate withholding.(45)
Employer Share of Payroll Taxes
According to the government, payroll taxes for Social Security and
Medicare are "paid equally by both employees and employers," with
each paying 7.65 percent.(46) While
that may be true for accounting purposes, economist Walter Williams
explains how it really works:
[Y]ou probably already believe . . . that your
employer pays half your Social Security. This lie may be
demonstrated by pretending that you're my boss. We agree to a wage
of $7.00 an hour. You deduct 50 cents an hour as my Social
Security contribution and add 50 cents as the "employer
contribution," making your cost to hire me $7.50 an hour. My
question is: If it costs you $7.50 to hire me, what is my minimum
hourly output for you to keep me on the job and stay in business?
If you said $7.50 an hour, go to the head of the class, because
you also know who pays all of the Social Security tax. The worker
does.(47)
Williams observes that the government maintains the myth that
employers pay half of Social Security and Medicare taxes because
Americans would "go ape" if they knew the true tax burden these
programs impose.
The government uses payroll taxes to help finance Social Security
and Medicare spending, including Old Age and Survivors Insurance
(OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Hospital Insurance (HI, or
Medicare Part A). When the government first imposed these taxes
during the 1930s, the rate was a combined 2 percent for earnings up
to $3,000 per year. Today's combined rate is 15.3 percent: 12.4
percent for OASDI for the first $62,700 of wage income, and 2.9
percent for HI for all labor income.
Payroll taxes have increased dramatically since 1937. According to
the Institute for Policy Innovation, over 90 percent of American
workers pay more in payroll taxes (including the "employer's share")
than they do in income taxes.(48)
Table 6 illustrates the rise in payroll tax rates in recent years.
Since 1977, the payroll tax rate has grown by nearly one-third, from
11.7 percent to 15.3 percent--and that doesn't include the big
increase in the wage base subject to payroll taxes.
|
Table 6. Combined Payroll Tax
Rates(49)
|
|
Year
|
OASDI Tax
|
HI Tax Rate
|
Combined
|
HI Tax Base
|
Maximum HI
|
|
1977
|
9.9
|
1.8
|
11.7
|
$16,500
|
$297
|
|
1978
|
10.1
|
2.2
|
12.1
|
$17,700
|
$389
|
|
1979
|
10.16
|
2.1
|
12.26
|
$22,900
|
$481
|
|
1980
|
10.16
|
2.1
|
12.26
|
$25,900
|
$544
|
|
1981
|
10.7
|
2.6
|
13.3
|
$29,700
|
$772
|
|
1982
|
10.8
|
2.6
|
13.4
|
$32,400
|
$842
|
|
1983
|
10.8
|
2.6
|
13.4
|
$35,700
|
$928
|
|
1984
|
11.4
|
2.6
|
14
|
$37,800
|
$983
|
|
1985
|
11.4
|
2.7
|
14.1
|
$39,600
|
$1,069
|
|
1986
|
11.4
|
2.9
|
14.3
|
$42,000
|
$1,218
|
|
1987
|
11.4
|
2.9
|
14.3
|
$43,800
|
$1,270
|
|
1988
|
12.12
|
2.9
|
15.02
|
$45,000
|
$1,305
|
|
1989
|
12.12
|
2.9
|
15.02
|
$48,000
|
$1,392
|
|
1990
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
$51,300
|
$1,488
|
|
1991
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
1 $125,000
|
$3,625
|
|
1992
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
$130,200
|
$3,776
|
|
1993
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
$135,000
|
$3,915
|
|
1994
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
2 none
|
no limit
|
|
1995
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
none
|
no limit
|
|
1996
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
none
|
no limit
|
|
1997
|
12.4
|
2.9
|
15.3
|
none
|
no limit
|
|
1 Prior to 1991, the upper
limit on taxable earnings was the same as for Social
Security. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
(OBRA 1990) raised the limit in 1991 to $125,000. Under
automatic indexing provisions, the maximum was increased to
$130,200 in 1992 and $135,000 in 1993.
2 The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 eliminated the indexing provision
entirely beginning in
|
The government collected some $472.4 billion in Social Security,
Disability, and Medicare payroll taxes in 1996. Deducting the amount
paid by self-employed workers, which is not hidden, leaves a rough
estimate of just over $432.7 billion in combined employer and
employee taxes. The hidden portion of this comes to $ 216.4 billion,
or $817 per person.(50)
Unemployment and Workers' Compensation Taxes
Around the same time the government instituted Social Security, it
mandated that states set up unemployment insurance programs.
Unemployment insurance, along with mandatory workers' compensation
insurance for on-the-job injuries, is a hidden tax that lowers
employees' wages.
Since unemployment insurance is mandatory, workers who stay
employed help finance payments to frequent job-changers. As George
Leef observed, "[T]hose workers who seek and hold steady jobs
are being compelled to subsidize the unemployment of workers who choose employment which is
apt to be sporadic." (51)
Unemployment insurance can also extend the amount of time people
stay out of work. According to Harvard University's Martin Feldstein,
"For those who are already unemployed, it (unemployment insurance)
greatly reduces and often almost eliminates the cost of increasing
the period of unemployment." (52)
The Impact of Hidden Labor Taxes
A recent Cato Institute study documented the impact that hidden
labor taxes have on America's workforce. The report found that while
an average full-time manufacturing worker earns about $27,200, it
costs employers $31,000 to hire the worker due to workers'
compensation, unemployment insurance, and the employer's share of
Social Security and Medicare taxes. As the study points out, this
money otherwise would have gone to the employee.
|
Table 7. Cost Per Hour for Civilian Employees, March
1997 (53)
|
|
|
Cost
|
Percent of Total
|
|
Total compensation
|
$19.22
|
100.0
|
|
Wages and salaries
|
13.85
|
72.0
|
|
Total benefits
|
5.37
|
28.0
|
|
Paid leave (including vacation, holiday, sick leave)
|
1.27
|
6.6
|
|
Supplemental pay
|
0.47
|
2.4
|
|
Insurance (including life, health, accident,
long-term disability)
|
1.23
|
6.4
|
|
Retirement and savings
|
0.75
|
3.9
|
|
Legally required benefits
|
1.62
|
8.4
|
|
Social Security and Medicare
|
1.11
|
5.8
|
|
Unemployment insurance (state and federal)
|
0.14
|
0.7
|
|
Workers' compensation
|
0.38
|
2.0
|
|
Other benefits
|
0.03
|
0.1
|
After deducting income and payroll taxes from his paycheck, the
worker keeps just $22,400. The total "tax wedge" from labor taxes is
$8,600, or 28 percent of the amount the employer pays. The amount
rises to 36 percent for employees earning $60,000, nearly half of
which does not appear on the pay stub.(54)
The average burden imposed by unemployment insurance and workers'
compensation taxes is $1,618 per employee.(55)
Appendix 2 shows the burden for each state. Table 7 gives a breakdown
of employee compensation costs.
Since mandated benefits raise the cost of hiring workers, they
destroy jobs and lower wages. An analysis of federal labor laws,
Social Security, and unemployment compensation laws from 1934 to 1940
found that these policies boosted the median unemployment rate to
17.2 percent from 6.7 percent.(56)
Import Taxes
Americans pay $18.7 billion in taxes on imported products, or $71
per person. As Table 8 shows, these taxes hit a broad range of
products.
Import taxes also boost the price of U.S.-made products. When
interest groups persuade Congress to protect their industry from
competition at the expense of the rest of the country, they can
charge higher prices than they would be able to maintain in a
competitive marketplace.
|
Table 8. Examples of Import Taxes
|
|
Imported Product
|
Hidden Tax
|
|
Babies' dresses, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton
|
12%
|
|
Bicycles
|
11%
|
|
Brooms (other than whiskbrooms), wholly or in part broom
corn,
valued over 96 cents each
|
32%
|
|
Brussels sprouts, fresh or chilled
|
12%
|
|
Certain infant formulas
|
18%
|
|
Electric blankets
|
13%
|
|
Fishing rods and parts
|
7%
|
|
Flashlights
|
18%
|
|
Frozen blackberries
|
11%
|
|
Girdles and panty-girdles
|
24%
|
|
Hammocks, of cotton
|
15%
|
|
Nonwoven disposable hospital apparel
|
4%
|
|
Nursing nipples and pacifiers, of plastics
|
3%
|
|
Peanut butter
|
143%
|
|
Roses, fresh cut
|
7%
|
|
School supplies, of plastics
|
5%
|
|
Screwdrivers
|
6%
|
|
Table linen of man-made fibers, not knitted or
crocheted
|
12%
|
|
Telephone sets
|
8%
|
Travel Taxes
Hotel and Car Rental Taxes
While the phrase "no taxation without representation" strikes a
chord with many Americans, it's often politically attractive to
impose a tax on those who are unable to vote. This process, called
"exporting" taxes, helps explain the popularity of hotel and
car-rental taxes in many communities. Politicians can tax out-of-town
voters to finance local projects, often at a stiff price. The specter
of room taxes ranging up to 17 percent and additional car rental
taxes can be an unwelcome surprise for American travelers.
One bed-and-breakfast owner described the problem: "Here in
Massachusetts we have a 5.7% room occupancy tax. In addition, towns
are permitted to add their own local tax, so in the same area, the
tax may be different depending on the specific town. Many people
don't know this and are perturbed to find out how much more they are
paying for a $125 room." (57) Another
owner observed: "Lodging establishments tend to despise the room tax,
the main reason being that the local governments spend the funds on things other than promoting
tourism and lodging." (58)
Nationwide, bed taxes average 11.7 percent, or $9.19 per night.
Tax rates are as high as 17 percent in Houston, and average more than
$24 per night in New York City. As of 1997, bed taxes cost $6.7
billion, or $25 a person.(59) Car
rental taxes average 8.24 percent.(60)
Hotel and car rental taxes are becoming an especially popular tool
to finance new sports stadiums. According to one report, at least 18
cities already have used these taxes to fund stadiums, with as many
as 20 more close behind.(61) One
analyst called travel taxes the "hottest trend" in stadium financing,
adding that ". . . these types of financing are sailing through local
city councils and municipalities." (62)
Most travelers who rent a car or stay at a hotel don't benefit
from the stadiums their taxes help finance. According to the Travel
Industry Association, only about 5 percent of travelers include attendance at a sporting event in
their activities.(63)
Airline Ticket Taxes
Airline ticket taxes are currently 9 percent of the fare plus $1
per domestic flight segment. The tax rate is scheduled to change as
follows:
|
Table 9. Changes in Ticket Taxes
|
|
Current
|
9 percent of fare plus $1/domestic flight segment
|
|
October 1, 1998
|
8 percent plus $2/domestic segment
|
|
October 1, 1999
|
7.5 percent plus $2.25/domestic segment
|
|
January 1, 2000
|
7.5 percent plus $2.50/domestic segment
|
|
January 1, 2001
|
7.5 percent plus $2.75/domestic segment
|
|
January 1, 2002
|
7.5 percent plus $3.00/domestic segment (the $3.00
is indexed for inflation thereafter)
|
In addition, the tax for international departures recently was
doubled to $12 per passenger and extended to apply to return
flights.(64) The government imposes
many other hidden costs on air transportation, including a 4.3
cents-per-gallon tax on airline fuel that costs $550 million, a $3.00
passenger facility charge that costs $1.2 billion, and a 6.25 percent
air freight tax that costs $361 million.(65)
The burden that ticket taxes impose on travelers was highlighted
when they temporarily expired during budget fights between President
Clinton and Congress. When the tax was reinstated in 1996, airlines
passed the cost along to consumers. As one story reported at the
time, "Major U.S. airlines have raised domestic fares 10 percent,
anticipating a 10 percent excise tax that President Clinton is
expected to sign into law today." (66)
Table 10 shows the impact of hidden vacation taxes for a family
headed from Chicago to Orlando.
|
Table 10. The Hidden Cost of a Family Disney World
Vacation(67)
|
|
Item
|
Cost (est.)
|
Tax Rate
|
Tax
|
|
4 roundtrip airline tickets, Chicago to Orlando, 2 flight
segments each way
|
$840
($210 each)
|
Ticket price includes $17.34 tax; add $1 per flight
segment per person
|
$85.36
|
|
5 nights lodging
|
$403
|
12.5 percent
|
$50.38
|
|
5 days rental car
|
$163.59
|
6 percent
|
$9.82
|
|
Total Hidden Tax
|
|
|
$145.55
|
Southwest Airlines Chairman Herbert D. Kelleher recently
summed up the effects of hidden taxes on his industry when he wrote:
"The Customer is only truly aware of the total fare. If that
is perceived as being too high, the airline receives the blame and
suffers the economic consequences if the Customer chooses not to
travel or to travel by other means [emphasis in original]."
(68)
Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI) has introduced legislation to repeal
recent airline ticket-tax increases.(69)
Bracket Creep
One side effect of inflation is that in a progressive tax system,
taxpayers will be bumped into higher tax brackets even if their real
income is unchanged. In the late 1970s, high inflation rates caused
middle-class taxpayers to face marginal tax rates far higher than
Congress initially intended. To prevent further bracket creep, in
1981 Congress voted to index federal tax rates and exemptions for
inflation.(70)
Unfortunately for most taxpayers, few states have taken similar
precautions to protect taxpayers from bracket creep. Only eight of
the states that impose income taxes automatically adjust their brackets, exemptions, and
deductions for inflation.(71)
This hidden "inflation tax" falls hardest on lower-income
taxpayers, since inflation sends them into higher tax brackets. Those
already paying the maximum rates are unaffected by bracket creep.
While the impact of bracket creep is different for each state,
Ohio provides an example of how this hidden tax works. According to a
Buckeye Institute study, the tax rate for a married couple each
earning $6 an hour was ten times higher in 1997 than it would have
been if Ohio's tax code had made allowances for inflation when it was
adopted in 1972.(72)
Severance Taxes
Most states impose a variety of severance taxes on natural
resources when producers "sever" them from the Earth. These taxes
apply to a wide array of products, ranging from oil and gas to
turpentine and timber. While the taxes are visible to the initial
producers, they are hidden from consumers who buy the finished goods
that are made from natural resources. State severance taxes cost
Americans $4.4 billion in 1996, or $17 a person.
Utility Taxes
Public utilities provided states with $8.6 billion in tax revenue
in 1996, or $32 per person. These taxes often are hidden from
consumers. According to the Edison Electric Institute (EEI), one
state imposes taxes that add 25 percent to electricity bills, but
then prohibits a separate line-item on bills that would inform
customers of their tax burden.(73)
EEI also calculates that utilities pay a total of $25.8 billion in
taxes of all kinds.
Utility regulations also force some electricity users to pay
higher prices to subsidize other users. The U.S. Department of Energy
estimates that these subsidies cost about $6 billion.(74)
As with telecommunications deregulation, energy deregulation should
provide the opportunity to make these taxes more explicit and
therefore possibly lower.
Insurance Premium Taxes
State taxes on insurance premiums cost Americans $9.1 billion in
1996. These taxes average $34 per person, a cost that often is hidden
in the price of insurance.
Licensing
Most states impose a broad range of licensing requirements on
different segments of the economy. One of the more prevalent examples
is the use of occupational licensing. The rationale for these
licenses is usually to protect consumers' health and safety, but in
reality they are often just hidden taxes that restrict competition
for the regulated profession.
As Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman and his wife Rose
commented: "The justification [for licensure] is always the
same: to protect the consumer. However, the [real] reason is
demonstrated by observing who lobbies at the state legislatures for
imposition or strengthening of licensure. The lobbyists are
invariably representatives of the occupation in question rather than
its customers." (75)
An example of licensing in practice is provided by the case of
Monique Landers, a high school student who opened a hair-braiding
business and won an award from the National Foundation for Teaching
Entrepreneurship. But since she didn't have a cosmetology license,
the state shut her down. According to Landers, "The [state
Cosmetology] Board won't let me earn my own money, and won't let
kids like me learn how to take care of ourselves. I think owning your
own business is a way of being free. If more kids knew they could
grow up to be their own boss they would be more responsible and cause
less trouble." (76)
In some states, Mary Kay representatives and their counterparts
from other companies can't even help their customers apply makeup
unless they first get a cosmetology license.
These hidden taxes drive up taxes for consumers, but they also limit
opportunities to enter many professions. Several studies have
concluded that licensing is especially detrimental to individuals
from minority groups. According to Dan Hogan, "The reliance of
licensing laws on academic credentials--which are less frequently
possessed by the poor, minorities, women, and the elderly--has a
deeply pernicious and discriminating effect, especially when evidence
does not exist that these credentials are positively correlated with
competence." (77) Randall Collins
reached a similar conclusion: "Since the evidence strongly shows that
credentials do not provide work skills that cannot be acquired on the
job, and that access to credentials is inherently biased toward
particular groups, the case for discrimination is easy to make."
(78)
Total state licensing, including occupational and corporate
licensing, cost $11.7 billion in 1996, the equivalent of $44 a
person.
Electronic Commerce
Use of the Internet is booming, and along with it online sales of
goods and services. According to the U.S. Commerce Department:
- Fewer than 40 million people around the world were connected to the Internet
during 1996. By the end of 1997, more than 100 million people were using the
Internet.
- As of December 1996, about 627,000 Internet domain names had been registered.
By the end of 1997, the number of domain names had more than doubled to reach
1.5 million.
- Traffic on the Internet has been doubling every 100 days.(79)
SUP>
This development has not escaped the eye of state taxing authorities.
As the Chairman of California's Tax Board noted:
Instead of applying traditional legal concepts to the taxation of
electronic commerce, state tax bureaucrats are becoming legal
contortionists in an attempt to tax Internet sales. The resulting
confusion among prospective Internet merchants and service providers
could substantially impede the development of electronic
commerce.(80)
Some states tax access to Internet service providers like America
Online, an especially questionable practice since the providers may
be located in another state.
|
Table 11. Taxation of Internet Access(81)
SUP>
|
|
|
State Tax Rate
|
Local Tax Rate
|
|
Connecticut
|
6%
|
--
|
|
District of Columbia
|
City--5.75%
|
--
|
|
Iowa
|
5%
|
Up to 1%
|
|
New Mexico
|
5%
|
Up to 1.25%
|
|
North Dakota
|
5%
|
Up to 1%
|
|
Ohio
|
5%
|
Up to 2%
|
|
South Carolina
|
5%
|
Up to 1%
|
|
South Dakota
|
4%
|
Up to 2%
|
|
Tennessee
|
6%
|
Up to 2.75%
|
|
Texas
|
6.25%
|
Up to 2%
|
|
Wisconsin
|
5%
|
Up to 1%
|
A recent Commerce Department report gave several principles for
Internet taxation: "The application of existing taxation on commerce
conducted over the Internet should be consistent with the established
principles of international taxation, should be neutral with respect
to other forms of commerce, should avoid inconsistent national tax
jurisdictions and double taxation, and should be simple to administer
and easy to understand." (82)
"Internet Tax Freedom" legislation is moving through Congress to
combat tax policies that could interrupt the growth of electronic
commerce. Among other things, the proposals would guarantee tax-free
Internet service and prohibit discrimination against commerce
transacted over the Internet.(83)
Phase-Outs of Deductions
While the above hidden taxes have been described in dollar terms,
there are many policies buried in the Tax Code that serve as hidden
taxes by forcing people to pay higher-than-normal marginal tax
rates--the rate paid on an additional dollar of income. The U.S.
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) recently reported on 22 provisions
that can make a taxpayer's marginal tax rate differ from the
statutory rates of 15, 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent.
The JCT concluded that two taxpayers with similar incomes can face
very different marginal tax rates. For example, older Americans can
face marginal tax rates of greater than 90 percent. All told, the JCT
found that 33.2 million taxpayers face effective marginal tax rates
that differ from the statutory rate.(84)
The Social Security earnings test provides an example of how
effective marginal tax rates can differ from statutory marginal tax
rates. Up to half of Social Security retirement benefits are taxable
for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income between $25,000 and
$34,000 ($32,000-$44,000 if married filing jointly). In other words,
once reaching $25,000, an additional dollar of income adds 50 cents
of Social Security benefits to taxable income. This provision makes
the effective tax rate 50 percent higher than the statutory rate.
Appendix 3 gives a complete list of the measures identified by the
JCT that alter marginal tax rates.
William Gale of the Brookings Institution concluded that some of
these provisions should be repealed:
The personal income tax contains several "take-back"
provisions. These taxes are imposed even when a taxpayer is
complying perfectly with the law but ends up with what the law has
deemed "too many" deductions or "too little" taxable income. These
items represent hidden taxes, they distort incentives, they raise
little revenue, and, most crucially, they create unnecessary complexity. They should simply be
repealed.(85)
Gale identified four features in particular for possible repeal:
phaseouts of personal exemptions, limitations on itemized deductions,
taxes on excess pension accumulations and payouts, and the individual
alternative minimum tax (AMT).
To simplify these numerous and complex phaseouts, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has proposed combining many of them
into just three schedules.(86)
Empowering Voters with Information
Hidden taxes cost the average American at least $638.8
billion--much more if the cost of income-tax withholding is included.
When taxes are not visible, Americans are unable to evaluate whether
they're getting their money's worth from the government. As a result,
hidden taxes help to boost the size of government.
Commenting on hidden telecommunications taxes, American Enterprise
Institute fellow James Glassman put his finger on the problem: "The
idea here is an old one: People can't rebel if they're kept in the
dark." (87)
In addition to increasing the size of government, hidden
taxes are an especially harmful way to raise money. Hidden taxes
distort the prices that Americans face, causing them to over-consume
some products and under-consume others. As a result, hidden taxes
inflict more economic damage than broad-based, visible taxes.
There is some good news. While hidden taxes are significant in the
United States, they could be even higher. For example, America is one
of the few countries without a value-added tax (VAT), a type of
hidden sales tax. In addition, the move to deregulate the
telecommunication and utility industries will help make taxes for
those services much clearer to consumers.
And even though governments have an incentive to hide the
cost of taxes, there are opportunities to make taxes more visible
even without government action. Many utility companies now include
the cost of taxes as a line item on their monthly billing statements.
More companies could take similar steps to itemize the cost of
taxes--gas stations, for example, could more prominently display the
cost of taxes or even tell consumers their tax bill every time they
fill up.(88)
On the payroll side, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy
has developed a "Right to Know Payroll Form" that employers can
distribute with their paychecks. The form shows the hidden cost of
policies including the "employer's share" of payroll taxes and the
cost of mandated workers' compensation and unemployment
insurance.(89) As Joe Lehman from the
Mackinac Center commented, "The Right to Know Payroll Form isn't
anti-government or pro-government. It's just giving people
information. Still, it's perfectly possible that a worker can look at
these numbers, see what government costs him, and conclude that he's
getting a good deal. This is all just information. It doesn't tell
you what conclusions to draw." (90)
Communities are much stronger when they consist of a well-informed
citizenry. Working to bring more hidden taxes into the open would
give Americans the information they need to make wise choices about
the role of government in the United States.
About the Author
Bryan Riley is a National Taxpayers Union Foundation
adjunct scholar.
Appendix 1: 1997 State Excise Tax Rates
|
|
Gas Tax
(Cents per Gallon)
|
Cigarette Tax
(Cents per Pack)
|
Spirits Tax
(Dollars per Gallon)
|
Table Wine Tax
(Dollars per Gallon)
|
Beer Tax
(Dollars per Gallon)
|
|
Alabama
|
16
|
16.5
|
56% (b)
|
.05/1.7 (c)
|
0.53
|
|
Alaska
|
8
|
29
|
5.6
|
0.85
|
0.35
|
|
Arizona
|
18
|
58
|
3
|
0.84
|
0.16
|
|
Arkansas
|
18.5
|
31.5
|
2.5
|
0.75
|
0.2
|
|
California
|
18
|
37
|
3.3
|
0.2
|
0.2
|
|
Colorado
|
22
|
20
|
2.28
|
.35/.32 (c) (d)
|
0.08
|
|
Connecticut
|
36
|
50
|
4.5
|
0.6
|
0.194
|
|
Delaware
|
23
|
24
|
5.46
|
0.97
|
0.156
|
|
District of Columbia
|
20
|
65
|
1.5
|
0.3
|
0.09
|
|
Florida
|
5
|
33.9
|
6.5
|
2.25
|
0.48
|
|
Georgia
|
7.5
|
12
|
3.79
|
1.51
|
0.32
|
|
Hawaii
|
16
|
80
|
5.87
|
1.34
|
0.91
|
|
Idaho
|
25
|
28
|
N.A. (b)
|
0.45
|
0.15
|
|
Illinois
|
19
|
44
|
2
|
0.23
|
0.07
|
|
Indiana
|
15
|
31
|
2.68
|
0.47
|
0.115
|
|
Iowa
|
20
|
36
|
N.A. (b)
|
1.75
|
0.19
|
|
Kansas
|
18
|
24
|
2.5
|
0.3
|
0.18
|
|
Kentucky
|
15
|
3
|
1.92
|
0.5
|
0.08
|
|
Louisiana
|
20
|
20
|
2.5
|
0.11
|
0.32
|
|
Maine
|
19
|
74
|
N.A. (b)
|
0.6
|
0.35
|
|
Maryland
|
23.5
|
36
|
1.5
|
0.4
|
0.09
|
|
Massachusetts
|
21
|
76
|
4.05
|
0.55
|
0.106
|
|
Michigan
|
19
|
75
|
13.85% (b)
|
0.51
|
0.2
|
|
Minnesota
|
20
|
48
|
5.3
|
0.3
|
0.077
|
|
Mississippi
|
18
|
18
|
2.5 (b)
|
0.35
|
0.4268
|
|
Missouri
|
15
|
17
|
2
|
0.36
|
0.06
|
|
Montana
|
27
|
18
|
26% (b)
|
1.02
|
0.139
|
|
Nebraska
|
25.3 (a)
|
34
|
3
|
0.75
|
0.23
|
|
Nevada
|
24
|
35
|
2.05
|
0.4
|
0.09
|
|
New Hampshire
|
18
|
37
|
N.A. (b)
|
0.3
|
0.3
|
|
New Jersey
|
10.5
|
40
|
4.4
|
0.7
|
0.12
|
|
New Mexico
|
17
|
21
|
6.05
|
1.7
|
0.41
|
|
New York
|
8
|
56
|
6.43
|
0.1893
|
0.16
|
|
North Carolina
|
22.3 (a)
|
5
|
28% (b)
|
0.79
|
(f)
|
|
North Dakota
|
20
|
44
|
4.05
|
0.5
|
0.16
|
|
Ohio
|
22
|
24
|
2.25 (b)
|
0.32
|
0.18
|
|
Oklahoma
|
17
|
23
|
5.56
|
0.72
|
0.4
|
|
Oregon
|
24
|
68
|
N.A. (b)
|
0.67
|
0.084
|
|
Pennsylvania
|
12
|
31
|
18% (b)
|
(e)
|
0.08
|
|
Rhode Island
|
28
|
61
|
3.75
|
0.6
|
0.097
|
|
South Carolina
|
16
|
7
|
2.72 (g)
|
1.28 (g)
|
.77 (g)
|
|
South Dakota
|
21
|
33
|
3.93
|
0.93
|
0.27
|
|
Tennessee
|
21
|
13
|
4
|
1.1
|
0.125
|
|
Texas
|
20
|
41
|
2.4
|
0.204
|
0.198
|
|
Utah
|
24.5
|
51.5
|
13% (b)
|
13% (b)
|
0.355
|
|
Vermont
|
19
|
44
|
25% (b)
|
0.55
|
0.265
|
|
Virginia
|
17.5
|
2.5
|
20% (b)
|
1.51
|
0.256
|
|
Washington
|
23
|
82.5
|
17.6% (b)
|
0.87
|
0.154 (h)
|
|
West Virginia
|
20.5
|
17
|
5% (b)
|
1
|
0.177
|
|
Wisconsin
|
24.8 (a)
|
44
|
3.25
|
0.25
|
0.065
|
|
Wyoming
|
9
|
12
|
N.A. (b)
|
(b)
|
0.02
|
Source: Tax Foundation, Facts and Figures on
Government Finance.
(a) Indexed for inflation. Nebraska's indexed rate
is revised quarterly. North Carolina's indexed rate is revised every
six months.
Wisconsin's indexed rate is revised every April 1.
(b) Control states. Rates represent tax over and
above state store markup.
(c) Rates represent native wine/non-native
wine.
(d) Effective July 31, 1997, the annual surcharge
for native wine will use an annual graduated rate: 5 cents per liter
for the first 9,000 liters,
3 cents per liter for the next 36,000 liters, and 1 cent per liter
for all additional amounts.
(e) 0.5 cents per unit of proof per wine
gallon.
(f) .48387 per gallon in barrels holding at least
7.75 gallons. .53376 per gallon in barrels holding less than 7.75
gallons.
(g) 9% surtax.
(h) Plus $4.78 per barrel beginning July 1,
1997.
Appendix 2:
Hidden Employment Taxes for an Average Manufacturing Wage
Worker
|
|
State Unemployment
Insurance Tax Burden
|
Workers' Compensation
Contribution
|
Combined Burden
|
|
Alabama
|
$72
|
$1,485
|
$1,557
|
|
Alaska
|
$532
|
$1,153
|
$1,685
|
|
Arizona
|
$119
|
$1,047
|
$1,166
|
|
Arkansas
|
$180
|
$1,017
|
$1,197
|
|
California
|
$266
|
$1,311
|
$1,577
|
|
Colorado
|
$120
|
$1,496
|
$1,616
|
|
Connecticut
|
$480
|
$1,507
|
$1,987
|
|
Delaware
|
$221
|
$1,303
|
$1,524
|
|
District of Columbia
|
$279
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
Florida
|
$112
|
$1,716
|
$1,828
|
|
Georgia
|
$111
|
$1,439
|
$1,550
|
|
Hawaii
|
$520
|
$2,470
|
$2,990
|
|
Idaho
|
$378
|
$971
|
$1,349
|
|
Illinois
|
$243
|
$1,292
|
$1,535
|
|
Indiana
|
$91
|
$685
|
$776
|
|
Iowa
|
$152
|
$868
|
$1,020
|
|
Kansas
|
$72
|
$1,371
|
$1,443
|
|
Kentucky
|
$160
|
$1,534
|
$1,694
|
|
Louisiana
|
$131
|
$2,154
|
$2,285
|
|
Maine
|
$259
|
$2,239
|
$2,498
|
|
Maryland
|
$204
|
$830
|
$1,034
|
|
Massachusetts
|
$400
|
$1,567
|
$1,967
|
|
Michigan
|
$409
|
$1,632
|
$2,041
|
|
Minnesota
|
$212
|
$1,248
|
$1,460
|
|
Mississippi
|
$98
|
$1,159
|
$1,257
|
|
Missouri
|
$160
|
$1,450
|
$1,610
|
|
Montana
|
$192
|
$1,934
|
$2,126
|
|
Nebraska
|
$56
|
$1,055
|
$1,111
|
|
Nevada
|
$258
|
N.A.
|
$258
|
|
New Hampshire
|
$80
|
$1,692
|
$1,772
|
|
New Jersey
|
$465
|
$1,227
|
$1,692
|
|
New Mexico
|
$199
|
$1,847
|
$2,046
|
|
New York
|
$308
|
$1,923
|
$2,231
|
|
North Carolina
|
$36
|
$982
|
$1,018
|
|
North Dakota
|
$128
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
Ohio
|
$207
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
Oklahoma
|
$100
|
$2,002
|
$2,102
|
|
Oregon
|
$420
|
$968
|
$1,388
|
|
Pennsylvania
|
$336
|
$1,640
|
$1,976
|
|
Rhode Island
|
$651
|
$2,258
|
$2,909
|
|
South Carolina
|
$140
|
$783
|
$923
|
|
South Dakota
|
$35
|
$1,224
|
$1,259
|
|
Tennessee
|
$126
|
$1,221
|
$1,347
|
|
Texas
|
$135
|
$1,716
|
$1,851
|
|
Utah
|
$142
|
$930
|
$1,072
|
|
Vermont
|
$208
|
$1,436
|
$1,644
|
|
Virginia
|
$96
|
$612
|
$708
|
|
Washington
|
$426
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
West Virginia
|
$240
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
Wisconsin
|
$210
|
$982
|
$1,192
|
|
Wyoming
|
$183
|
N.A.
|
N.A.
|
|
U.S. Average
|
$223
|
$1,395
|
$1,618
|
Source: Dean Stansel, "The Hidden Burden of
Taxation: How the Government Reduces Take-Home Pay," Cato Institute
Policy Analysis No. 302, April 15, 1998.
Appendix 3:
Policies That Alter Marginal Tax Rates for
Individuals
|
Provision
|
Tax Rate
|
Applicable AGI Range
|
Taxpayers Affected (Millions)
|
|
Phaseout of exclusion of Social
Security benefits
|
1.5 times the statutory rate for first
tier
|
Single: $25,000-various
1
|
5
|
|
|
|
Joint: $32,000-various
1
|
|
|
|
1.85 times the statutory rate for second
tier
|
Single: $34,000-various
1
|
|
|
|
|
Joint: $44,000-various
1
|
|
|
"Pease" limitation on itemized
deductions
|
1.03 times the statutory rate
|
$124,500-various
|
4.5
|
|
7.5-percent floor on medical
deduction
|
1.075 times the statutory rate
|
Any taxpayer itemizing medical
deductions
|
4.5
|
|
2-percent floor on miscellaneous
deductions
|
1.02 times the statutory rate
|
Any taxpayer itemizing miscellaneous
deductions
|
8.8
|
|
10-percent floor on casualty
loss
|
1.10 times the statutory rate
|
Any taxpayer itemizing deductions for
casualty loss
|
0.2
|
|
Phaseout of personal exemption
|
The statutory rate multiplied by 1.0 plus
0.0216 for each exemption
|
Single: $124,500-$247,000
|
1.4
|
|
|
|
Head/househ.:
$155,650-$278,150
|
|
|
|
|
Joint: $186,800-$309,300
|
|
|
Phase-in of earned income
credit
|
No children: statutory rate minus 7.65
percentage points
|
$0-$4,460 2
|
4.4
|
|
|
One child: statutory rate minus 43
percentage points
|
$0-$6,690 2
|
|
|
|
Two children: statutory rate minus 40
percentage points
|
$0-$9,390 2
|
|
|
Phaseout of earned income
credit
|
No children: statutory rate plus 7.65
percentage points
|
$5,570-$10,030 2, 3
|
11.7
|
|
|
One child: statutory rate plus 15.98
percentage points
|
$12,260-$26,473 2,
3
|
|
|
|
Two children: statutory rate plus 21.06
percentage points
|
$12,260-$30,095 2,
3
|
|
|
Phaseout of child credits
|
Statutory rate plus 5 percentage
points
|
Single: $75,000-various
3
|
0.6
|
|
|
|
Joint: $110,000 3
|
|
|
Partial phaseout of dependent care
credit
|
Statutory tax rate plus 2.4 percentage
points (generally 17.4 percent)
|
$10,000-$28,001
|
1.6
|
|
Phaseout of eligibility for deductible
IRA
|
Between 1.0 and 1.2 times statutory rate
4
|
Single: $30,000-$40,000
|
1.5
|
|
|
|
Joint: $50,000-$60,000
|
|
|
Phaseout of eligibility for Roth
IRA
|
Single: between 1.0 and 1.133 times the
statutory rate 4
|
Single: $95,000-$110,000
|
Not available
|
|
|
Joint: between 1.0 and 1.2 times the
statutory rate 4
|
Joint: $150,000-$160,000
|
|
|
Phaseout of eligibility for education
IRA
|
Greater than statutory rate by a
percentage determined by the 5 percent or 3.3 percent
phaseout rate and the interest rate
|
Single: $95,000-$110,000
|
Not available
|
|
|
|
Joint: $150,000-$160,000
|
|
|
Phaseout of HOPE credit
|
Single: statutory rate plus 15 percentage
points for each $1,500 in credits
|
Single: $40,000-$50,000
3
|
1.2 (includes lifetime learning
credit)
|
|
|
Joint: statutory rate plus 7.5 percentage
points for each $1,500 in credits
|
Joint: $80,000-$100,000
3
|
|
|
Phaseout of Lifetime learning
credit
|
Single: statutory rate plus 15 percentage
points for each $1,500 in credits
|
Single: $40,000-$50,000
3
|
Included in estimate of HOPE
credit
|
|
|
Joint: statutory rate plus 7.5 percentage
points for each $1,500 in credits
|
Joint: $80,000-$100,000
3
|
|
|
Phaseout of deductibility of interest on
qualified student loans
|
1.167 times statutory rate (for maximum
deduction available in 2001)
|
Single: $40,000-$55,000
3
Joint: $60,000-$75,000
3
|
0.3
|
|
Phaseout of exclusion of interest from
education savings bonds
|
Single: (1 + exclusion amount/$15,000)
times statutory rate
|
Single: $52,250-$67,250
3
|
Not available
|
|
|
Married: (1 + exclusion amount/$30,000)
times statutory rate
|
Head/househ.: $52,250-$67,250
3
|
|
|
|
|
Married: $78,350-$108,350
3
|
|
|
Phaseout of credit for elderly and
disabled
|
Statutory rate plus 7.5 percentage
points
|
Single: $7,500-maximum of
$17,500
|
0.2
|
|
|
|
Joint: $10,000-maximum of
$20,000
|
|
|
Phaseout of adoption credit and
exclusion
|
Credit: credit amount/$40,000 plus
statutory rate
|
$75,000-$115,000 3
|
Not available
|
|
|
|
Exclusion: (1+ exclusion
amount/
$40,000) times statutory rate
|
|
|
Phaseout of first-time homebuyer credit
for D.C.
|
Statutory rate plus 25 percentage
points
|
Single: $70,000-$90,000
3
|
Not available
|
|
|
|
Joint: $110,000-$130,000
3
|
|
|
Phaseout of rental real estate losses
under passive loss rules
|
1.5 times statutory rate
5
|
$100,000-$150,000
|
Not available
|
|
Phaseout of rehab tax credit under
passive loss rules
|
1.5 times statutory rate
|
$200,000-$250,000
|
Not available
|
|
Income phase-in of recapture of subsidy
of qualified mortgage bonds
|
Statutory rate plus percentage
pointsequal to the taxpayer's recapture amount divided by
5,000
|
Defined relative to area median
income
|
Not available
|
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation.
1 Applicable range defined by reference
to provisional income and modified AGI is used in lieu of
AGI.
2 Assumes all income is earned
income.
3 Income range measured by reference to
modified AGI.
4 Phaseout affects future year tax
liability. Present value of effective marginal tax rate depends on
length of time the account is maintained and the interest
rate.
5 Stated effective rate overstates
lifetime effect as provision allows suspended losses in future
years.
Endnotes
2. Not including withholding of
income and payroll taxes from paychecks.
3. Personal consumption
spending from Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and
Product
Accounts,
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/pitbl.htm;
state taxes from Bureau of the Census,
http://www.census.gov/govs/statetax/96tax.txt; federal taxes from
Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the
United State Government, Fiscal Year 1999; local taxes
estimated
from 1994 Census data based on the ratio of state to local government
revenue, http://
www.census.gov/govs/estimate/94stlus.txt.
4. For example, states without
an income tax tend to have a lower tax burden than states that
maintain an income tax on top of other taxes, and countries that
impose value-added taxes in addition to income taxes tend to have a
higher tax burden than those that don't. See Richard Vedder, "State
and Local Taxation and Economic Growth," http://www.senate.gov/~jec/sta&loc.html.
5. Calculated from Census
Bureau and Office of Management and Budget data.
6. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
"Governments Finance and Employment Classification Manual,"
http://
www.census.gov/govs/manual/ch7.txt.
7. According to Americans for
Tax Reform, Americans must work more than half the year on
average
to finance the total cost of government, including regulatory,
paperwork, and other costs. See http://
www.atr.org/.
8. 1996 data except for 1993
Workers' Compensation from U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
9. Author's calculation from
Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the
United State Government, Fiscal Year 1999, and population data
from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
10. For a more detailed
exploration of this issue, see "The Incidence of the Corporate Income
Tax,"
Congressional Budget Office, March 1996.
11. In Daniel Mitchell,
The Flat Tax: Freedom, Fairness, Jobs, and Growth, The
Heritage Foundation, 1996, p. 13.
12. Arthur B. McKinnickell,
Martha Starr-McCluer, and Annika E. Sunden, "Family Finances in the
U.S.: Recent Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,"
Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 1997, p. 11.
13. U.S. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Transportation Studies Annual Re-port, 1997: Mobility and
Access, pp. 95-79, http://www.bts.gov/programs/transtu/tsar/tsar97/
tsar97pt.html.
14. U.S. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National
Transportation
Statistics 1997, Table 2-8, http://www.bts.gov/btsprod/nts/tbl2x8.html.
(Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.)
15. Ed Brown, "Where Your Gas
Money Goes," Fortune, April 27, 1998.
16. Stephen Moore, "Give
Motorists a Tax Break," Cato Institute Commentary, December
2, 1997.
17. U.S. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics,
Federal, State, and
Local Transportation Financial Statistics: Fiscal Years 1982-94,
BTS97-E-02, p. 34 (totals may not exactly
add due to rounding).
18. Adam Thierer, "Heady With
the Power to Tax Beer," Washington Times, September 15,
1996.
19. "The Tax Burden on 80
Million Beer Drinkers," DRI/McGraw-Hill Study, June 1996. Graphic
inspired by Coors Brewing Company.
20. "No More Increases in the
Federal Excise Tax on Distilled Spirits," Distilled Spirits Council
of the United States Fact Sheet, http://www.discus.health.org/nomorfet.htm.
21. "Soak the Poor?"
Investor's Business Daily, April 15, 1998.
22. Joint Committee on
Taxation, "Description of Present Law and Proposals Relating to
Tobacco Tax and Trust Fund and Other Provisions," statement before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, May 14, 1998.
23. Office of Management and
Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1999.
24. "What is the Price of
Universal Service?: Impact of Deaveraging Nationwide Urban/Rural
Rates,"
Telecommunications Industries Analysis Project, Cambridge, Mass.,
1993, cited in Wayne Leighton, "What to Do About Universal Service
Subsidies: Support for High-Cost Areas," Citizens for a Sound Economy
Issue Analysis Number 39, September 30, 1996.
25. Office of Management and
Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1999.
26. S. 1909, introduced April
2, 1998.
27. "Taxes, Taxes, and More
Taxes," Washington Times editorial, August 25, 1996; see
also www.atr.org.
28. George Nastas and Stephen
Moore, "A Consumer's Guide to Taxes: How Much Do You Really Pay in
Taxes?," Cato Institute Briefing Paper No. 18, April 15,
1992.
29. News release, "Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) Hails Introduction
[of] House & Senate Legislation to Repeal the 3% Federal
Excise 'Tax on Talking,'" April 1, 1998.
30. Telecommunications Act of
1996, section 254.
31. Kent Lassman, "Somebody is
on the Take: Universal Service at Home on the Range," Washington
Times, February 16, 1998.
32. Stephen J. Entin,
Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation, "Hidden Phone
Tax a Bad Way to Pay for Internet Access," IRET Congressional
Advisory, December 30, 1997, p. 2.
33. The Honorable Harold
Furchgott-Roth, "FCC Report to Congress on Universal Service," FCC
98-67, April 10, 1998, p. 138.
34. Michael O. Leavitt, Letter
to FCC Re: CC Docket 96-45, January 22, 1998.
35. In "FCC Report to Congress
on Universal Service," p. 140.
36. Statements of The
Honorable James C. Miller III, Counselor, Citizens for a Sound
Economy, and John E. Berthoud, Ph.D., President of the National
Taxpayers Union, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law,
February 26, 1998.
37. In James K. Glassman, "A
New Tax for the New Year," Washington Post, December 2,
1997.
38. "Comments of Sprint
Corporation before the FCC," CC Docket 96-45, January 28, 1998, p.
2.
39."The FCC's Universal
Service and Access Reform Decisions," December 1997, http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/universal_service/fcc97157/
factsheet.txt.
40. FCC Chairman Reed Hundt,
"Notable and Quotable," Wall St. Journal, June 23, 1997, p.
18.
41. In Charlotte Twight,
"Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of
Institutional Change," Cato Journal, Vol. 14 No.
3.
42. Cited in Charlotte
Twight.
43. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr.,
and Joseph J. Thorndike, "The Plan that Slogans Built: Current
Collection, Withholding, and Tax Forgiveness Under the Revenue Act of
1943," The Tax History Project at Tax Analysts, http://www.taxhistory.org/
Studies%20in%20Tax%20History/studies2.htm.
44. Cited in Charlotte
Twight.
45. H.R. 340, introduced
January 7, 1997.
46. U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1996 Green
Book, November 4, 1996.
47. Walter Williams, "Medical
Benefit Fact and Fiction," Washington Times, Nov. 27, 1989,
p. F3.
48. Gary and Aldona Robbins,
"Tax Deduction for Payroll Taxes: An Analysis of the Ashcroft
Proposal,"
IPI Quick Study, 1997, p. 1.
49. U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1996 Green
Book, November 4, 1996.
50. Estimate based on payroll
tax revenue from Budget of the United States and employment
data from the U.S. Small Business Administration.
51. George C. Leef, "Time to
Rethink Unemployment Insurance," Mackinac Center for Public
Policy
Research Viewpoint on Public Issues, December 7,
1992.
52. Martin Feldstein,
"Unemployment Compensation: Adverse Incentives and Distributional
Anomalies," National Tax Journal, June 1974, p. 231, cited
in George Leef.
53. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, http://
stats.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.t01.htm.
54. Source: Dean Stansel (Cato
Institute), "Concealed Pay Bites," Washington Times, April
14, 1998.
55. Dean Stansel, "The Hidden
Burden of Taxation: How the Government Reduces Take-Home Pay," Cato
Institute Policy Analysis No. 302, April 15,
1998.
56. Richard Vedder and Lowell
Gallaway, Out of Work: Unemployment and Government in 20th
Century America (Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 1992).
57. Erni Johnson, December 16,
1997, http://www.innsite.com/innkeeping/archives/9712/0035.html.
58. Bob Weinman, December 15,
1997, http://www.innsite.com/innkeeping/archives/9712/0019.html.
59.American Hotel Foundation,
Impact of Tax Increases in the Lodging Industry, 1998, p.
3.
60. Travel Industry
Association of America News Release, "17 Cities Sock it to Travelers
to Pay for
Stadiums," December 4, 1996.
61. Susanna P. Barton and
Sougata Mukherjee, "Tourism Taxes for Stadiums Draw Fire,"
Jacksonville Business Journal, April 7, 1997.
62. Marty Greenberg, director
of the National Sports Law Institute at Marquette University, quoted
in Barton and Mukherjee.
63. In Barton and
Mukherjee.
64. Office of Management and
Budget, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1999.
65. Air Transport Association
of America, "Taxes and Fees" Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., March
1998.
66. Greg Groeller and Susan
Miller, New York Times News Service, "Airlines Beat Clinton to
Increasing Fares: President Will Reinstate Today the 10 Percent
Excise Tax on Tickets," August 20, 1996.
67. Author's
calculation.
68. Herbert D. Kelleher,
letter to House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Chairman Bud Shuster, June 15, 1998.
69. Rep. Neil Abercrombie News
Release, "Abercrombie Bill to Block Air Ticket Tax Raise," July 31,
1997.
70.. Michael R. Baye and Dan
A. Black, "Indexation and the Inflation Tax," Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
No. 39, July 12, 1984.
71. Federation of Tax
Administrators, "State Individual Income Tax Rates," http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/ind_inc.html.
72. Samuel Staley and Robert
Lawson, "Ohio Keeps Poor Down with Unfair Taxes," Buckeye Institute
Perspective, April 1997, p. 1.
73. Edison Electric Institute,
"Why Doesn't Electricity Cost the Same Everywhere?," Electric
Utility/
Restructuring Issues, http://www.eei.org/Industry/structure/power3.htm.
74. U.S. Department of Energy
news release, "Administration's Plan Will Bring Competition to
Electricity, Savings to Consumers," March 25, 1998.
75. Milton Friedman and Rose
Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, 1979),
p. 240.
76. Monique Landers, cited in
Cascade Update, Cascade Policy Institute, Spring/Summer
1994, p. 2.
77. Dan B. Hogan, The
Regulation of Psychotherapists, Vol. I: A Study in the Philosophy and
Practice of Professional Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing, 1979) p. 282, in Stanley J. Gross, "Professional
Licensure and Quality: The Evidence," Cato Institute Policy
Analysis No. 79, December 9, 1986, p. 27.
78. Randall Collins, The
Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and
Stratification (New York: Academic Press, 1979) p. 198, in
Stanley J. Gross, "Professional Licensure and Quality: The Evidence,"
Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 79, December 9, 1986, p.
27.
79. U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Emerging Digital Economy, April 15,
1998.
80. Dean F. Andal, California
Tax Board Chairman, letter to Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden
(D-OR), March 12, 1997.
81. National Council of State
Legislatures, "Which States Tax Internet Access?," March 1998,
http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/fiscal/intertax.htm.
82. U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Emerging Digital Economy, Chapter 3,
Electronic Commerce Between Businesses, April 15, 1998.
83. H.R. 1054/S. 442. See
http://www.house.gov/cox/
nettax/
for details.
84. Joint Committee on
Taxation, "Present Law and Analysis Relating to Individual Effective
Marginal Tax Rates," February 3, 1998.
85. William G. Gale, "Tax
Reform is Dead, Long Live Tax Reform," Brookings Institution
Policy Brief No. 12.
86. "AICPA Legislative
Simplification Proposal on Phase-Outs Based on Income Level," January
1998, http://www.aicpa.org/.
87. James K. Glassman, "A New
Tax for the New Year," Washington Post, December 2,
1997.
88. On the other side of the
coin, some companies may prefer to keep the cost of taxes hidden. For
example, retailers trying to sell a $300 suit might not want their
customers to know that the suit is actually worth much less after
taxes are taken into account.
89. See www.mackinac.org
for more information.
90. "Showing Government's
Burden," Investor's Business Daily Perspective, April 1,
1997, p. B1, http://www.mackinac.org/topics/special/special.htm.